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The ethics of the ethics of autonomous vehicles: Levinas and naked streets 
 
Abstract 
My starting point in this paper is that investigating the ethics of autonomous vehicles 
through the lens of the trolley problem is not only limited but also unethical. I 
construct my case by aligning myself with Niklas Toivakainen, who argues against 
David Gunkel’s reading of Levinasian ethics as an answer to the ‘Machine Question’. 
I adumbrate Toivakainen’ s critique that the attempt to give a Levinasian face to the 
machine is an example of a compensatory logic – a way to avoid a deeper 
exploration of the moral dynamics from which our technologies emerge. I offer an 
extended reading of Levinas’s formulation of the face of the other to argue that while 
the machine cannot signify as a face, the machine can announce or anticipate the 
signification of the face which the self is infinitely responsible to. I reach this 
conclusion through focusing on the uncertainty and ambiguity of the signification of 
the face. I then argue that current approaches to the ethics of autonomous vehicles, 
based on variations of the trolley problem, fail to locate ethical responsibility to the 
other, precisely in its attempts to evade uncertainty. I demonstrate how an embrace 
of uncertainty can make the ethics of autonomous vehicles more ethical through a 
consideration of the concept of shared space, and naked streets, in the work of the 
late Dutch traffic engineer Hans Monderman.    
 
 
Autonomous vehicles are one of the more exciting and disruptive technologies 
coming out of the fourth industrial revolution (4IR). In response, a thriving cottage-
industry has emerged to tackle the vexatious issue of the ethics of self-driving 
vehicles.  Who, it is asked, should be held responsible for injuries and fatalities that 
might arise from any collision in, or with, an autonomous vehicle? Should the owner 
of the vehicle, or the manufacturer be held responsible? (Hevelke and Nida-Rümelin 
2014) Or should the engineers who design the algorithms that steer the vehicle be 
held responsible? (Nyholm and Smids 2016) In attempting to answer these 
questions, the ethics of autonomous vehicles seems to have settled on the so-called 
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‘trolley-problem’ as the lens through which to explore solutions. The trolley problem1 
(whose genesis goes back to a paper by Phillipa Foot (1967)) imagines a scenario in 
which a moral agent has the power to prevent a run-away trolley from colliding into, 
and killing, five persons, by pulling a lever which diverts the trolley onto another track 
only to collide with, and kill, one other person.   
The ethics of autonomous vehicles employs these utilitarian calculations to 
determine, inter alia, how an autonomous vehicle should react to one or more 
persons, or children, or animals suddenly, and unexpectedly, appearing in its path. 
Should it swerve violently to avoid a pregnant woman, but not an old man, and risk 
death or injury to the driver and/or passengers?2 Some have suggested that 
autonomous vehicles might incorporate ‘personal ethics settings’ (not unlike interior 
climate control settings) which would allow the owners of the autonomous vehicles 
themselves to decide which life they place a greater value on – pregnant women or 
elderly men (Gogoll & Muller 2017). Other theorists, like Himmelreich (2018), warn 
against the siren of fanciful, though not improbable, scenarios that form the basis of 
many trolley problems, urging us instead, to repurpose the title of his paper, to mind 
the trolley and consider the ethics of autonomous vehicles in mundane situations. 
Himmelreich (670) argues that “the usefulness of trolley cases in investigations of 
the ethics of autonomous vehicles is limited”, joining authors such as Goodall (2016), 
and Nyholm and Smids (2016).  
 
1 Himmelreich (2018) distinguishes between trolley cases and trolley problems – the former consisting of a 
scenario in which there exists only the option between colliding with a person appearing in front of a car or 
swerving to avoid a collision with that person; while the latter consists of two or more cases taken together. 
Himmelreich notes that many contributions in the literature do not make this distinction. I will not make this 
distinction as it is not pertinent to my argument.   
2 See Awad et al. (2018) in which participants in a world-wide survey on autonomous vehicles indicated that 




In this paper, I will argue that the usefulness of trolley cases in interrogating the 
ethics of autonomous vehicles is not only limited, but also unethical. In exploring 
what the ethics of the ethics of autonomous vehicles encompasses, I will then be 
circumscribing a meta-ethical position3. The ethics of autonomous vehicles, I claim, 
cannot be considered apart from what it means to be, in the terms used by 
Emmanuel Levinas (1969), “infinitely responsible to and for the other”.  
I will characterise all formulations of the trolley problem as an example of what 
Toivakainen (2016) calls ‘compensatory logic’ – a manner of thinking which obscures 
whether progress (human advancement) stems from the ethical meaning we make of 
(technological) progress, or whether “ethics is forced to accommodate itself to the 
demands of progress” (279). Toivakainen illustrates his notion of compensatory logic 
by examining companion robots in elderly care. He then asks, ‘what is our 
relationship to machines really like?’, which he later clarifies in the following way:                                               
How it is that we have come to a situation in which we need to start 
developing care-bots in the first place – and what kinds of moral dynamics is 
involved here? (ibid.)  
My project directs Toivakainen’ s question toward autonomous vehicles and asks 
what moral dynamics are involved if we consider that the primary reason given for 
developing autonomous vehicles is improved road safety. Toivakainen, following 
 
3 A meta-ethical claim in the standard sense of the term typically takes an ethical claim as its subject matter 
but is not itself an ethical claim. I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to this point. 
In this paper I diverge from this practice which is necessitated by the distinction I draw between ethics and 
Levinasian ethics. At this preliminary stage one way to note the distinction is that ‘ethics’ attaches to theory 
and involves principles, norms and imperatives. Levinasian ethics eschews any overarching theory and does 
not posit any ethical principles. This will be made clearer in the paper’s first section. Kantianism, Utilitarianism 
and Virtue ethics constitute the triumvirate of standard contemporary ethical theories. In the context of the 
trolley problem and autonomous vehicles, the term ‘ethics’ should be disambiguated even further because 
these are invariably discussed from within a utilitarian framework.     
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Gunkel (2012), enlists the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas, who argues for ‘ethics as 
first philosophy’, to claim that we find ourselves always already enmeshed within 
ethics. Every situation is normatively constituted. This means that the ethics of 
autonomous vehicles, or companion robots, cannot be considered after the 
technological details are worked out. Gunkel (2012) applies Levinasian ethics in 
order to posit a ‘machine-face’, which would allow moral consideration to extend to 
machines, including autonomous cars and care-bots. Toivakainen disagrees with 
Gunkel’s move, arguing that a machine cannot have, or be, a face in the Levinasian 
sense. I side with Toivakainen. 
I will also enlist the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas (1969) but will emphasise different 
aspects of his thought to make my case. In particular, I will focus on how the face of 
the other signifies its ethical singularity as “meaning all by itself” (Levinas 1985; 86). 
Toivakainen does reference this phrase, but in passing, and assigns it a very narrow 
import. I will expand on other Levinasian formulations of the face, inter alia, that the 
face is “signification without context” (ibid.).   
To illustrate how these ideas might be brought to bear on practice, particularly within 
the context of road safety, I will turn to the work of the late Dutch traffic engineer 
Hans Monderman. Monderman’ s conceptualisation of ‘naked streets’, implemented 
in various forms in over 400 towns across Europe, sees road markings and other 
traffic signals reduced to a bare minimum (Jenkins 2016). Removing traffic signs 
creates ambiguity, thus inducing uncertainty in the driver. This in turn heightens the 
driver’s responsiveness, which, inter alia, reduces speeding, making the road safer 
for all users. I make the case that traffic signals and roads, as a form of technology, 
can also signify the face of the other. More specifically, traffics signals and roads, in 
announcing or anticipating the face of the other, signify the singularity and 
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vulnerability of the other to whom I am infinitely responsible4. The conclusion I reach 
is that in embracing the ambiguity and uncertainty that sharing public space entails, 
particularly on the road, the ethics of autonomous cars can be made more ethical.   
The paper will proceed as follows: In the section to follow, I trace the critique that 
information ethics (IE) follows on from a centrist driven ethics that seeks to expand 
moral consideration from a privileged (human) ‘we’ outwards to include machines. 
The trolley problem, framed within Utilitarianism, is paradigmatic of the dilemmas of 
responsibility centrist driven ethics gives rise to within the ethics of autonomous 
vehicles. Gunkel employs Levinasian ethics to address centrist ethics’ shortcomings 
within the ‘machine question’. Toivakainen charges Gunkel with a misreading of 
Levinas. In section two I adumbrate Toivakainen ‘s notion of a compensatory logic 
which prevents us from delving deeper into questioning our relationships with 
machines, moving from his example of companion robots to this papers’ central 
concern with autonomous vehicles. Compensatory logic forestalls an interrogation of 
the moral dynamics which frame the emergence of any particular new technology 
and their impact on society. In the present case, compensatory logic forestalls an 
ethical consideration of the impact of autonomous vehicles on road-safety when 
ethical consideration is understood in Levinasian terms.  In section three I expand on 
how the Levinasian face signifies the alterity, or ‘otherness’ of the other as ‘meaning 
all by itself’. This is in service of supporting the claim that the machine has no alterity 
of itself that is capable of signification. Instead, what the machine can signify is the 
alterity of the other person and the responsibility that is owed to her. In the final 
section of the paper, I turn to the example of Monderman’ s ‘naked streets’ in order 
to illustrate how the ethical responsibility owed to the (Levinasian) face might be 
 
4 I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for helping me clarify this important claim. 
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signified within, or through certain technologies, as against those technologies being 
able to signify meaning ‘all by themselves’ the way a (Levinasian) face does. In their 
privileging of the Other, these considerations offer a more ethical approach than the 
trolley problem to developing the ethics of autonomous cars.     
Levinasian ethics: An ethics of ethics  
 
Centrist ethics and the machine question 
In ‘Machines and the face of ethics’, Niklas Toivakainen (2016) critically assesses 
David Gunkels’ response, in The Machine Question (2012), to the exclusivist or 
centrist logic that undergirds most IE. Centrist ethics operates by positing a 
privileged ‘we’ whose shared features, such as rationality, constitute grounds for 
moral consideration. This central ‘we’ is then expanded by demonstrating how a 
particular attribute “is also found in the ‘other’ (or a segment of them) or then to 
identify some new characteristic upon which the new ‘we’ gets founded” 
(Toivakainen 2016; 270). So, for example, utilitarians bring non-human animals into 
the circle of moral consideration by arguing that they share a capacity for suffering 
with humans. Similarly, IE seeks to broaden the moral ‘we’ by arguing that “anything 
that is a coherent body of information ought to be worthy of our moral consideration” 
(ibid.). As such, this will allow space for robots and machines within the ethical 
domain, either as moral agents or moral patients, or both. 
The charge against centrist ethics is that by pursuing sameness it necessarily elides 
what is different and singular (271). To qualify for entrance into the newly expanded 
‘we’, the excluded other must become like the ‘we’. If we cannot recognise some 
feature in the other, the basis on which we can say that the other is like us, then we 
have insufficient reason to broaden the ethical domain to include that other. To 
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counter this reductionism and as a solution to ‘the machine question’, Gunkel (2012) 
enlists the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas. Levinasian ethics is not merely a privileging 
of otherness, or what Levinas terms ‘alterity’, over sameness; otherness is what 
constitutes subjectivity (Levinas 1969). More particularly, as Toivakainen (2016; 271) 
clarifies, it is the  
relationship between the self and the other [which] is in fact the constitutive 
foundation of the very structure of the subject and of ethics.  
The relationship between the self and the other is one marked by a radical 
asymmetry: the autonomy of the self is held hostage to the ethical demand the 
vulnerability of the other before me creates – an unconditional, non-reciprocal infinite 
responsibility for her (Levinas 1969; 43). This is Levinas’s definition of ethics – the 
“calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other” (ibid.). Such a 
definition resists an easy answer to the classic ethical question, ‘What ought I to 
do?’, whether it be acting to maximise overall happiness – utilitarianism – or acting 
so as not to treat the other as a means – Kantianism5. 
Levinas (1985; 99) claims that I owe the other everything –  
I am responsible for a total responsibility, which answers for all the others and 
for all in the others, even for their responsibility. The I always has one 
responsibility more than all the others.  
I can expect no reciprocity from the other, however – “in pure charity, I know what I 
owe the other. What the other owes me, that’s his business (2001; 54). How does 
Levinas defend this bewildering claim?   
 
5 See FN.3 above on the distinction between ethics and Levinasian ethics, in which the former is generally 
explicated within an ethical theory such as Kantianism or Utilitarianism.  
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Levinas (1969; 39) argues that “[T]he absolutely other is the Other”. In other words, 
the other person presents me with a radical otherness, a radical alterity. Any attempt 
to understand this radical alterity of the other will require me to enlist categories such 
as gender and race, or reasoning and suffering ability, the very features, the basis on 
which, centrists seek to broaden a privileged ‘we’. In the process of attempting to 
represent the ethical demand as X or Y, as a demand for restorative racial justice, for 
example, I am reducing the others’ radical otherness to sameness. Levinas 
describes this as a ‘totalisation’ of the other. Bauman (1993; 90) describes how the 
alterity of the other eludes us, and its mired in ambiguity and uncertainty:  
I embark on the search for the content of the command. But I cannot find that 
content in any way except through ‘representing’ […]  What I ‘find’ is the 
Other’s command as I have articulated it; my representation of the Other’s 
voice.  
I cannot determine what my specific responsibilities to the other before me are 
because I cannot determine the other’s singularity. I cannot comprehend the 
“strangeness” (Levinas 1969; 43) of the other before me, only that I am completely 
and irrecusably responsible, somehow, to and for her.  
The upshot of this is that the self, in Gunkel’s (2012; 177) words, 
does not constitute some pre-existing self-assured condition that is situated 
before and is the cause of the subsequent relationship with an other. It does 
not (yet) take the form of an active agent who is able to decide to extend him- 
or herself to others in a deliberate act of compassion. Rather it becomes what 
it is as a by- product of an uncontrolled and incomprehensible exposure to the 
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face of the Other that takes place prior to any formulation of the self in terms 
of agency.  
For Levinas (1998; 114), the self is not a sovereign totality who constitutes themself 
in an act of Cartesian self-creation – ‘I think, therefore I am’ – rather, the self is an 
election by the other – ‘I am chosen, therefore I am’. It is the alterity of the other 
which the self cannot incorporate into its knowledge of the world which arrests the 
self’s agency, just like the idea of infinity whose ideatum cannot be incorporated into 
its idea (Levinas 1969; 49). The ‘face’ is the central figure in this encounter with the 
other, who transforms the subject from a for-itself into a subject for-the-other, from 
one interested in its own freedom to one disinterested.  
The term ‘face’ has a specific meaning within Levinasian ethics and is arguably his 
best known and celebrated concept6. The face of the other is the mode in which the 
other presents her alterity (Levinas 1969; 50) rather than the composite of inter alia, 
eyes, nose, and mouth. The face is thus better understood as a verb – the face 
presents the uniqueness of the other through facing me in an originary encounter.  
Levinas (1985; 86) says that the face is “meaning all by itself”. Toivakainen’ s (2016; 
272) reading of this important Levinasian citation is that  
ethics is not something the ‘self’ can determine […] It is not we that give the 
other’s face its meaning or construct it, but rather, it is through our encounter 
with the (meaning of the) face of the other that we become (gain the meaning 
of) a ‘self’, a self with thoughts, emotions, consciousness etc., a self that then 
can impose and project all kinds of ‘meanings’ on the other. 
 
6 The face takes centre stage in his first magnum opus, Totality and Infinity (1969); whereas in his second, 
Otherwise than Being (1998), the concept of the Saying and the Said is foregrounded.  
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The idea of an originary face to face encounter and the rejection of a ‘pre-existing 
self-assured’ subjectivity is captured in Levinas’s (1989) claim that ethics is first 
philosophy. Ethics comes before ontology – who, or what is the other or subject? – 
and before epistemology – how can we know the other and the other’s demands on 
us, or, how can the subject know itself? Ethics as first philosophy seeks to justify our 
human existence before explaining our existence. Gunkel (2012; 175) expresses 
ethics as first philosophy as ‘‘a kind of morality before morality’’. Toivakainen (2016; 
271) elaborates on this and explains that “any ethical theory or norm already 
presupposes that which makes ethics ethics.” Toivakainen (2016; 271) uses 
Floridi’s(2002; 300) normative claim that ‘fighting information entropy is the general 
moral law to be followed’ “fighting information entropy is the general moral law to be followed 
to illustrate the Levinasian point that this norm by  
itself does not clarify what makes it ethical, but always points to something 
that is always already there, something in relation to which the norm is 
established, something that makes it ethical.   
For Levinas, what ‘makes something’ ethical, whether it be a normative claim or 
principle, finds its ultimate source in the singularity of the other whom I encounter 
face to face.  
The subtitle of this paper takes its inspiration from Derrida’s (1978; 111) formulation 
of Levinasian ethics as “an ethics of ethics”. An ethics of ethics offers itself as a 
means to evaluate whether any particular way of discovering or determining the 
ethical is itself an ethical way to proceed. This paper’s aim is to demonstrate that the 
ethics of autonomous vehicles, hitherto variations on the trolley problem, in turn, 
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explorations framed within Utilitarianism, has not itself been ethical in the Levinasian 
sense.  
Toivakainen (2016; 274) traces how Gunkel attempts to posit a ‘machine face’ by 
building on the not uncommon charge that the Levinasian face privileges the human 
over the non-human (cf. Llewelyn 1991; Diehm 2000; Derrida 2008). While Levinas 
(1988) was deeply ambivalent on the possibility of an ‘animal face’, some 
commentators have read Levinas to grant not only non-human animals a face 
(Atterton 2011) but also the environment (Casey 2001). In granting animals and the 
environment a face we can no longer claim that they do not make any moral 
demands on us. Possessing a (Levinasian) face means that we are responsible to 
and for animals and the environment because they are not like us. Gunkel hopes to 
replicate this strategy in order to grant the machine ethical status7. Gunkel (2012) 
argues that 
before something is decided to be either a moral agent or a moral patient, we 
make a decision whether to make this decision or not (175) [… and…] We, 
individually and in collaboration with each other (and not just those others who 
we assume are substantially like ourselves), decide who is and who is not part 
of the moral community (214).  
Toivakainen’ s critique of Gunkel’s reading of Levinas  
 
It is at this point that Toivakainen (2016; 274) parts way with Gunkel, and correctly 
so. Despite Gunkel’s “respectful relation” to Levinasian ethics (as first philosophy), 
 
7 In ‘Is the machine question the same question as the animal question?’ Hogan (2017) also critically analyses 
Gunkel’s The Machine Question (2012). She argues that the machine and animal questions are not alike, basing 
her argument on the distinction between moral agency and moral patientcy, a distinction, she argues, Gunkel 
fundamentally misconstrues.  
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what Gunkel gets wrong about Levinasian ethics is his claim that it is up to us, 
whether individually or collectively, to decide who (or what) is worthy of moral 
consideration (ibid.). It is not up to us to decide who has a face or not, that is, it is not 
up to us to decide where our responsibility to and for the other ends. To recall, ethics 
is, on Levinas’s account, an arresting of our autonomy by the other – we are hostage 
to the demands of the other. We are not free to decide whether to be in an ethical 
relation with the other or not, that is, we are not free to decide that X counts as a 
face and Y does not. This does not mean that I cannot turn away from the face and 
ignore its demands, but that is a matter of proposing norms in which we decide who 
or what to exclude from moral consideration. I will get to how Levinas regards norms, 
and normativity, as opposed to ethics, shortly.  
Another way to understand this criticism is to consider Toivakainen’ s response to 
Gunkel’s (2012; 201) conclusion that “cybernetics” (Floridian IE, inter alia) offers one 
of the more promising ways to offer “a radical, posthuman theory that deposes 
anthropocentrism and opens up thoughtful consideration to previously excluded 
others”. Toivakainen (2016; 274) argues that Gunkel’s (flawed) “understanding of the 
‘decision’’ involved in [Levinasian] ethics takes him back to an idea that it is up to our 
decision to include the machine”. As such, Gunkel succumbs to the very centrist 
paradigm he so virulently opposes. Toivakainen attributes this to Gunkel’s 
“conception that in order to reach a higher level of inclusion, we are in need of a 
better theory” (ibid.).  
Levinas does not offer us a theory of ethics because theories require categories, 
concepts, and systemisation, which in turn reduce the alterity of the other into a 
totalising sameness. This leaves any attempt to ‘apply’ Levinas to any normative 
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question, machine or otherwise, on tenuous terrain. Elsewhere, Levinas (1985; 90) 
will expand on what this entails: 
My task does not consist in constructing ethics; I only try to find its meaning. 
One can without doubt construct an ethics in function of what I have just said, 
but this is not my own theme. 
By ‘constructing ethics’, Levinas means precisely a theory of ethics, or a system of 
norms to guide ethical behaviour; while the meaning of ethics is grounded in the 
relationship with the other in the originary face-to-face encounter.  
Commentators in the literature have gone about ‘constructing ethics’ by capitalising 
on Levinas’s notion of the third party (1969; 212-5) – the other of the other – to the 
original dyad of self and other. Exploring this important theme is beyond the scope of 
this paper. However, I will include one citation in which Levinas (1998; 157) explains 
that the third,  
is of itself the limit of [infinite] responsibility [to and for the other] and the birth 
of the question: What do I have to do with justice? […] Justice is necessary, 
that is comparison, coexistence, contemporaneousness, assembling […] 
‘Justice’ is for me something which is a calculation, which is knowledge, and 
which supposes politics; it is inseparable from the political. It is something 
which I distinguish from ethics, which is primary.   
In short, all the formulations of ‘constructing ethics’, or a theory of ethics, or a system 
of normative injunctions; or dispensing justice and circumscribing politics, amount to 
the same thing, which Critchley (2004; 178) neatly sums up as “the art of a response 
to the singular demand of the other”. I will explore one interpretation of this ‘art’ in the 
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third section of the paper where Levinas talks about the gesture of ‘after you, sir’, as 
an example of demonstrating infinite responsibility to and for the other.  
To recapitulate this section’s salient points: IE, which includes the ethics of 
autonomous vehicles, has typically approached its problems by employing ‘centrist 
ethics’ – a positing of a privileged ‘we’ whose shared features with other agents 
constitute grounds for moral consideration. However, centrist ethics, in pursuing 
sameness, elides that which is other. A corrective to this is found in Levinasian 
ethics where otherness, or alterity is constitutive of the subject. The Levinasian 
subject arises in a face-to-face encounter with the other in which the alterity of the 
other arrests the agency of the self. Two readings of Levinas within the context of the 
‘machine question’ were then outlined. I followed Toivakainen ‘s position that Gunkel 
misconstrues Levinas insofar as Gunkel claims that it is possible to decide, using 
ethical theory, who (or what) is worthy of moral consideration.  
The compensatory logic of the machine-face 
 
Returning to Toivakainen’ s critique of Gunkel, Toivakainen (2016; 275) argues that 
moral consideration was extended to slaves and animals, inter alia, not because 
these were given a face –  
the problem was not that the slave did not have a face; the problem was that 
the slave-society suppressed and repressed it. [...Rather…] their faces have 
now been acknowledged and permitted to be (socially 
accepted/acknowledged as) faces.   
Toivakainen is now able to clarify the question that Gunkel fails to ask and which 
results in Gunkel falling back onto a centrist logic:  
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Why it is that we should at all be concerned with our moral relationship — or 
lack of it — to machines? […] Why are we concerned with how to relate to 
machines? Why does Gunkel feel it to be important to ask about the face of 
machines? Have we mistreated the machine, the way slaveowners mistreated 
their slaves, in ways that indicate that it in fact has a face that has been 
repressed? (ibid.). 
Rather than asking whether the machine has a face, Toivakainen argues that we 
should instead ask, “what is our relationship to machines really like?” (ibid.). 
Furthermore, “if the machine is to have a face, then it already has one, or if it is a 
question of a future machine then similarly it must bear its own ethical meaning and 
cannot be given one” (ibid.). In other words, if machines are entitled to moral 
consideration it is not because they do not have a face but because we have, 
wrongly, supressed that face. That the machine must bear its own ethical meaning is 
in reference to Levinas’s claim that the face is ‘meaning all by itself’ (op cit.). 
Toivakainen cites this phrase – ‘meaning all by itself’ – twice (272; 274) in the course 
of his paper, which he says he takes to mean that “who or what has a face is not up 
to us to decide”. I have examined this understanding above. However, Toivakainen 
does not consider other formulations Levinas offers of the face’s ‘meaning all by 
itself’8. In the very same cited passage, Levinas (1985; 86) says that the “face is 
signification, and signification without context”. What this amounts to, argues Levinas 
(2001; 48), is that the face “is an appeal or an imperative given to your responsibility: 
to encounter a face is straightaway to hear a demand and an order”. In seeking to 
 
8 Toivakainen (2016; 275-278) supplements his Levinasian analysis by critiquing the work of Introna (2014) in a 
section called ‘In search of the machine-face’. Introna elaborates on Heidegger’s notion of Gelassenheit, 
‘letting be’, in order to include artefacts such as machines into the ethical domain. I will not comment on this 
as my concern is only with Toivakainen’ s notion of ‘compensatory logic’.   
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answer Toivakainen’ s question in the context of the ethics of the ethics of 
autonomous cars, I will focus and expand upon how and what the face signifies, as 
well as the ambiguity and uncertainty of this signification. I undertake this in the 
section to follow. I now continue Toivakainen’ s critique by explicating his notion of 
‘compensatory logic’.     
Toivakainen (2016; 279) sharpens his question – what is our relationship to 
machines really like? –  further on as  
how it is that we have come to a situation in which we need to start 
developing [ technology ‘X’] in the first place – and what kinds of moral 
dynamics is involved here – when all the resources are focused on ‘progress 
and ‘development’?  
For technology ‘X’ Toivakainen discusses the case of companion robots in elder-
care, in particular, the interactive seal-doll Paro9. I will be discussing autonomous 
vehicles as another instance of technology ‘X’. In the case of companion robots in 
elder care, the driver of technological advancement is the rationalisation of medical 
care and the imperative to cut costs, human carers being more expensive (ibid.). 
Animal companions are one tried and tested way to ease the loneliness of residents 
in elder care homes. However, animal themselves require special care and their 
housing and feeding is costly. An animal robot as a companion solves these issues. 
What is absent here is the examination of the moral dynamics that drive these 
calculations. These might include considerations of the dissolution and/or 
reconfiguration of the traditional extended family; or the impact of an ageing 
population (especially in developed countries) on public resources. How should we 
 
9 See http://www.parorobots.com/ 
17 
 
allocate resources between the competing demands of primary and elderly 
healthcare? Or with education? Who should bear the greater responsibility for the 
elderly? Society or the family? These are all normative considerations that should 
require our attention before embarking on the quest to make a robotic seal more 
empathetic. Toivakainen (281) remarks that  
robots, to the extent they are meant to take over the task of care work, are an 
extension of the form of alienation that is already included in institutionalised 
care work. 
Toivakainen (280) calls the quest for a machine-face, or a more empathetic robot, a 
‘compensatory logic’, a way to “compensate for absent humans and living beings”. 
Compensatory logic allows us to avoid asking the tough questions of whether 
companion robots and other technologies are  
ways of taking responsibility or avoiding it? Do they build on a conception of 
freedom as something tied to responsibility, or a conception of freedom solely 
built on rights and independence from others? (ibid.).  
Toivakainen argues that compensatory logic leads to technological advances that 
while seeming to contribute “something new and important’, can instead, “obscure a 
problem by ‘solving’ it without addressing it” (Turkle 2011; 283 in Toivakainen 2016; 
280). How might autonomous vehicles obscure a problem by solving it, with personal 
ethics settings for example, without addressing that problem? To answer that 
question, I will identify the primary problem that autonomous vehicles purport to 
solve is traffic safety (Gogoll & Muller 2017).  
What the ethics of autonomous vehicles also fails to adequately address is our moral 
attitudes with respect to the law in general and road-safety law in particular. 
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Otherwise law-abiding citizens will regularly speed or talk on their cell-phones whilst 
driving. Why do such infractions of the law attract such blasé attitudes when they are 
significant contributing factors to road accidents and fatalities? While social mores 
towards drunk-driving have hardened in the last two decades or so, it used to raise 
few eye-brows when an inebriated friend insisted, slurring, that he was fine to drive 
home. These dangerous attitudes still exist, particularly in less developed countries 
where alternatives like Uber – a ride hailing app – are not available.  
Tangentially to safety, there are also salient moral dynamics to consider when we 
examine the working conditions in long-distance trucking. Truck drivers commonly 
face immense pressure to deliver their payloads within a set timeframe and face 
financial penalties if they do not. This often results in them foregoing regulated rest 
stops, forcing them to continue driving under conditions of extreme fatigue. 
Substituting truck drivers with autonomous trucks purports to solve these problems 
by obscuring them. The ethics of autonomous vehicles currently construed avoids 
asking these prior moral questions.  
How then do we make an ethics of autonomous vehicles ethical, that is, responsible 
to and for the other? We could also phrase the question in terms that summarise this 
section’s claims: What is our relationship to autonomous vehicles really like? Where 
can we locate the face, if at all, in autonomous vehicles? What does the 
compensatory logic of the ethics of autonomous vehicles, explored using the trolley 
problem framed within a utilitarian ethics, reveal about how ethical responsibility 
operates in such a framework? Before attempting to answer that, I turn now to how 
and what the (Levinasian) face signifies.  
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Meaning all by itself: The naked face 
 
Levinas remarks that the ‘face is meaning all by itself’. He also, in the same 
interview, says that the “face is signification, and signification without context” (1985; 
86). By this Levinas means that ordinarily, who we are is signified within certain 
contexts – being a professor, a judge, the son of a famous politician, wearing certain 
clothes etc… But our alterity is not any one of these signifiers, or rather, our 
uniqueness amounts to something much more than the totality of these significations 
– our singularity, our face, is ‘meaning all by itself’. Perpich (2008; 69) argues that 
the face  
represents the inadequacy of every image to the task of representing the 
other and, as such, paradoxically, represents the impossibility of its own 
representational activity.  
Elsewhere, Perpich (194) captures the ambiguity and uncertainty that is at the heart 
of the face’s signification: “‘I am this’, the face says, ‘but not only this’. And even as it 
refuses representation in one sense, the face demands it in another”. 
Levinas (1985; 86) continues by arguing that the face “is the most naked [and…] the 
face is exposed, menaced”. Exposed to, and menaced by what, or who? The self, 
who attempts to eliminate the ambiguity of the other’s signification. By establishing 
the certainty of who or what the other is, the self seeks to affirms its own autonomy. 
The self then systematically erodes the alterity of the other in order to represent and 
categorise the other into profession, race, religion etc.  However, the other resists my 
attempts to represent their alterity, by facing me in the face-to-face encounter. The 
Other resists their totalisation with a “resistance of what has no resistance – the 
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ethical resistance” (Levinas 1969; 199). It is this resistance that holds my subjectivity 
hostage and binds me with an infinite responsibility to and for the other.  
What then does the face signify? Levinas (66) says that the face speaks. The 
manifestation of the face is already discourse. […] To present oneself by signifying [, 
by facing,] is to speak”. Elsewhere, Levinas (1985; 89) expands on this: “the first 
word of the face is the ‘Thou shalt not kill’”. This imperative should not be understood 
only literally, but also as the metaphysical violence of reducing the other to the same. 
Levinas continues,  
there is a commandment in the appearance of the face, as if a master spoke 
to me. However, at the same time, the face of the Other is destitute, it is the 
poor for whom I can do all (ibid.).  
The other thus arrests my freedom (to represent and categorise her) through the 
very force of their vulnerability.    
How then can we not subject the other to the metaphysical violence of reducing them 
to the same? How can we demonstrate, in our everyday lives, our recognition of the 
irreducible singularity of the other and our infinite responsibility to safeguard that 
singularity? Levinas is frustratingly vague on this, and this is precisely because, as 
described in the first section, to do so would amount to ‘constructing ethics’, that is, 
prescribing a system of norms. Levinas (1998; 117) does however suggest that this 
is possible, and is epitomised in the slightest of everyday gestures, “the little there is, 
even the simple ‘after you sir’”. Perpich (2008; 135) clarifies Levinas’ argument: 
[t]he events we recognize as ethical, from the polite gestures of social 
commerce to the selfless lives of saints, and everything in between, are 
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predicated upon or find their condition in the unconditionality of being hostage 
[to the demands of the other].  
The simple hand gesture that signifies to another to enter a building before oneself, 
and which demonstrates our recognition of the other’s alterity, recalls Levinas’s 
characterisation of the face as the mode, or the way in which the other presents 
themselves. What this means is that while the face might be ‘meaning all by itself’, it 
is not the holder of all the meaning the other is. The back, or the nape of the neck of 
the other, can signify the alterity of the other just as well as the face. Levinas (2001; 
208), referencing a scene in Vasily Grossman’s (1985) novel Life and Fate, talks 
about people lining up, in Moscow, to hear about news of friends and relatives 
arrested for political crimes and would “each [read] on the nape of the person in front 
of him the feelings and hopes of his misery”. Here Levinas is interpreting Grossman 
(1985; 683 in Morgan 2007; 5) who describes one Yevgenia, who  
had never realized that the human back could be so expressive, could so 
vividly reflect a person’s state of mind. People had a particular way of craning 
their necks as they came up to the windows; their backs, with their raised, 
tensed shoulders, seemed to be crying, to be sobbing and screaming. 
The face is signification, but so too is the back and the neck; the face speaks of the 
suffering of the other and the concomitant demand to ease that suffering, but so too 
does the back and the neck.   
In the previous section, I traced Toivakainen’ s argument that the search for a 
machine-face is an example of compensatory logic, and that if the machine is to 
have a face, then it must bear its own ethical meaning. Toivakainen is sceptical 
about such a possibility. In light of this sections’ circumscription of how and what the 
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face signifies, a better formulation is to ask ‘how can the machine signify its alterity?’ 
The answer seems straightforward enough: It cannot, because the machine has 
none to signify – it is not singular in the way a person is. What the machine can 
signify however, is the alterity of the other (singular) person and the responsibility 
that is owed to her. In other words, while the machine cannot signify as a face, that 
is, it cannot signify without context, it can signify the face of the other which does. 
The machine announces or anticipates the signification of the face which the self is 
infinitely responsible to10.  
Understanding the signification of machines in this way allows us to avoid the trap of 
a compensatory logic because the moral dynamics of Levinasian intersubjectivity –
the self as for the other – remain front and centre regardless of the context, whether 
that be the elderly and care-bots, or the enhancement of road-safety and 
autonomous vehicles. In the final section of this paper, I turn to a more pedestrian 
(pun intended) technology than autonomous vehicles to demonstrate how a traffic 
signal might announce the signification of the face. In the process I argue that the 
technology of ‘shared space’ is a technology that can enable safer and more 
ethically responsible autonomous vehicles. 
Before doing so, a summary of the section: Levinas says that the face signifies 
without context, but because the other is singular such a signification is always 
ambiguous and uncertain. Levinas also claims that it not only the face, but also the 
back and the neck which can signify the alterity of the other, or in another 
formulation, can ‘speak’ the other’s alterity. I then argued that because a machine 
 
10 As a modality, the face might be understood as operating like a machine which produces alterity. The face 
then, could be a machine, but the machine could not be a face.     
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cannot be singular in the way a human can, it cannot signify as a face. The machine 
can however announce or anticipate the signification of the face. 
Naked streets 
 
Although there are no hard and fast definitions, the concept of ‘shared space’ “is an 
approach to street design which minimises demarcations between vehicles and 
pedestrians” (Moody & Melia 2013; 384). The concept originated with the Dutch 
traffic engineer Hans Monderman whose original aims were “to reduce accidents and 
congestion and to increase the flow of traffic” (ibid.). Hamilton-Baillie (2008; 133) 
argues that this can be achieved by the  
removal of the familiar characteristics associated with the highway, such as 
road markings, traffic signals, signs, kerbs, bollards and barriers [which] can 
dramatically change the relationship between people, places and traffic. 
The removal of traffic lights and signals, inter alia, from certain streets has led to 
these also being called ‘naked streets’ (Mckone 2010). While the concept of shared 
space has evolved to include wider aims such as “a modal shift to walking and 
cycling, enhancement to the public realm and improved health” (Hamilton-Baillie 
2008; 137), my focus will remain on the traffic safety aspect of shared space.  
Hamilton-Baillie (133) outlines the rationale behind the idea of naked streets: “in the 
absence of rules, predictability and certainty, drivers have to rely on cultural signals 
and informal social protocols.” In other words, ambiguity and uncertainty forces us to 
be more responsive through demanding greater attention from us within a particular 
traffic situation and hence, to take up greater responsibility. It is at this point where I 
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return to the notion of the signification of the face, whose core modality also operates 
through ambiguity and uncertainty.  Monderman (in McNichol 2004) argues that  
a wide road with a lot of signs is telling a story. It’s saying go ahead, don’t 
worry, go as fast as you want, there’s no need to pay attention to your 
surroundings. 
That is to say, the face of the other is here anticipated by a wide road with lots of 
signs. The road and its signs, with all their pragmatic prescriptions, announces the 
responsibility the self owes to the other which impinges upon the agency of the self, 
in this case, to drive as fast as they please. The road here tells the story of a self 
who believes it can escape the unambiguous command of the face which says, 
‘don’t kill me’, in this case by speeding. 
Another way the road might bear the meaning of the face of the other can be 
gleaned from Hamilton-Baillie (2004; 58) discussing Monderman in the context of 
footpaths: 
In a suburban street, a footpath meets a main estate road at right angles. In 
the United Kingdom, this insignificant intersection would probably be marked 
by a “safety barrier” to cut the footpath from the road. By contrast, 
Monderman expresses the presence of the footpath into the road through 
special surface treatment and a slight rise in level; not enough to constitute a 
speed hump, but enough to subtly draw the driver’s attention to the status and 
significance of the footpath and the possible arrival of teenage skateboarders.  
The slight rise in road level announces the face of the other who is in this instance a 
teenage skateboarder. The slight rise in the road level anticipates an unknowable 
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other whose uncertain appearance strips me of my agency to act unconditionally, 
which in this context amounts to driving in a carefree manner.  
Monderman (in Jenkins 2016) argues that “the freedom to assess risk for ourselves 
is what makes us safer” and that “the greater the number of prescriptions, the more 
people’s sense of personal responsibility dwindles”. While the first half of 
Monderman’ s remark would seem to indicate a freedom only in service of the self, 
the second half reveals that such freedom is circumscribed by responsibility. This is 
Levinasian freedom – Levinas (in Goud 2008; 21) argues that the “willingness to 
serve [the Other] is actually freedom, namely election. In the place of autonomy, I put 
election based on untransferable responsibility”. Monderman (in Schulz 2006) also 
argues that “the many rules strip us of the most important thing: the ability to be 
considerate. We’re losing our capacity for socially responsible behaviour.” The ability 
to be considerate is exactly, like the simple gesture ‘after you, sir’, a demonstration 
of the investiture of our freedom as responsibility, that is, our infinite responsibility to 
and for the other. 
One conference, dedicated to implementing Monderman’ s ideas of naked streets, 
adopted the guiding motto ‘Unsafe is safe’ (Schulz 2006). This recalls the modality of 
the Levinasian face – as that which resists (its totalisation) without resistance. It is 
now an easy step to arguing for this paper’s claim: roads can be made safer by 
making them signify the ambiguity and uncertainty of the faces that traverse them. 
The road in its nakedness announces the nakedness of the face of other who is in 
the instance a road-user. Naked streets and shared space demonstrate how the 
notion of an infinite responsibility toward an unknowable other who can only signify 





In response to Toivakainen’ s invocation of Turkle’s (2011; 283 in Toivakainen 2016; 
280) remark that certain technologies might “obscure a problem by ‘solving’ it without 
addressing it”, I asked ‘how might autonomous vehicles obscure the problem of 
traffic safety by solving it without addressing it?’ One way the ethics of autonomous 
vehicles tries to solve the problem of autonomous vehicles is to ask whose safety 
should be prioritised in the event of an accident involving an autonomous vehicle. 
Determining this involves categorising road-users into, inter alia, ‘pedestrian’ or 
‘passenger’. The rules of the road and other traffic signals assist in this demarcation 
and are meant to remove any ambiguity around such demarcation. In trying to 
remove the uncertainty such distinctions entail we try to solve the problem of who 
should be assigned greater weight, the pedestrian or the passenger, in the moral 
calculations required by the trolley problem. In doing so we do not address the 
problem autonomous vehicles present to our notion of responsibility. Not 
accountability, or blameworthiness, but our infinite responsibility to and for the other 
which must be worked out in the finite confines of the vehicles, autonomous and 
otherwise, that transport us. 
If, as this paper argues, we understand autonomous vehicles as announcements or 
anticipations of the face of the other, then the ethics of autonomous vehicles can 
escape the compensatory logic it has fallen into through its fixation on the trolley 
problem as a way to understand the ethical stakes. To do so, autonomous vehicles 
will need to embrace the ambiguity and uncertainty that the face signifies, as the 
technology of naked streets tries to do. In risking less safe autonomous vehicles, we 
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